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Division, Second Department, marked a departure from a longstanding rule of third-party practice, holding that, under CPLR
1007, a third-party claim for damages greater than the amount demanded by the plaintiff may be interposed.
It is hoped that The Survey's commentary on these and other
decisions of special interest will serve the goal of alerting the practitiorier to recent developments in diverse areas of New York
practice.
ARTICLE

3

-

JURISDICTION AND SERVICE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT

CPLR 311(1): Secretary's practice of acceptingprocess deemed authorization by appointment of agent for service upon corporation
To effect personal service on a corporation, CPLR 311(1) requires delivery of the summons "to an officer, director, managing
or general agent, or cashier or assistant cashier or to any other
agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service." 1
Since service upon an individual not enumerated in the statute
generally is invalid despite later redelivery to a proper party, 2 the
I CPLR 311(1) (Supp. 1979-1980). Enacted in 1962, this subsection adopted and com311.01; The Survey, 44 ST. JOHN's L.
bined sections of the Civil Practice Act. 1 WK&M
REv. 313, 325 (1969). The terms "officer, director, managing or general agent" were intended
to simplify the phraseology of the CPA without changing its substance. See SECOND REP., at
161.
Section 311 does not confer jurisdiction, but merely prescribes the method of serving a
corporation. CPLR 311, commentary at 254 (1972); cf. CPLR 302 (1972) (basis for personal
jurisdiction). While pre-CPLR case law apparently authorized substituted service on corporations, see Lorenz-Schneider Co. v. Teamsters Local 802, 17 App. Div. 2d 842, 842 (2d
Dep't 1962), CPLR 311(1) expressly requires "delivery" to the named persons and has been
construed to prohibit the use of the substituted service provisions of CPLR 308(2)-308(4).
See Melendez v. Sharet Realty Corp., N.Y.L.J., Nov. 15, 1963, at 16, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County); SIEGEL § 70, at 76. Nevertheless, a corporation can be served validly under CPLR
311(1) by delivering process to an agent "authorized . . . by law to receive service," such as
the Secretary of State, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 304 (McKinney 1972), or a registered agent
for service of process, id. § 305; see SIEGEL § 70.
2 See, e.g., McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 238 N.E.2d 726, 291
N.Y.S.2d 328 (1968); Boser v. Burdick, 62 App. Div. 2d 1134, 404 N.Y.S. 2d 187 (4th Dep't
1978); Commissioners of State Ins. Fund v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 281 App. Div. 867, 119
N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st Dep't 1953); Guidone v. Saint Aloysius Church, 65 Misc. 2d 1019, 319
N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County 1971). In McDonald, the process server left the summons with a building receptionist who was not employed by the defendant corporation. 22
N.Y.2d at 114, 238 N.E.2d at 727, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 330. Although the receptionist later redelivered the summons to a proper person, the Court held that the service was improper, relying on the general rule that service upon the wrong party is invalid notwithstanding that the
papers eventually are delivered to the party to be served. Id. at 114-15, 238 N.E.2d at 728,
291 N.Y.S.2d at 331. The Court found that to uphold service "would encourage carelessness,
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extent to which lower-level corporate employees qualify as agents
for receipt of service has been a recurrent issue.3 Recently, in Sullior worse, thus increasing the risk of default by parties who in fact fail to receive the summons." Id. at 116, 238 N.E.2d at 728-29, 291 N.Y.S.2d at 332. In an earlier lower court case,
delivery to the corporation's receptionist, who gave the summons to a managing agent, was
sustained since "the delivery [to the appropriate party was] so close both in time and space
that it [could] be classified as a part of the same act." Green v. Morningside Heights Hous.
Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 124, 125, 177 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), afj'd, 7 App.
Div. 2d 708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1st Dep't 1958). The McDonald Court approved Green by
distinguishing it: "[T]he process server ...acted reasonably and diligently in attempting to
fulfill the statutory mandate and under circumstances bringing the questioned process
within the purview of the person to be served." 22 N.Y.2d at 115-16, 238 N.E.2d at 728, 291
N.Y.S.2d at 332.
3 For cases dealing with service upon lower-level corporate employees, see Fashion Page,
Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 69 App. Div. 2d 787, 415 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st Dep't 1979); Isaf v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969); Commissioners
of State Ins. Fund v. Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 281 App. Div. 867, 119 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1st
Dep't 1953); Buckner v. D & E Motors, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 382, 278 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1967).
Much of the litigation has involved the interpretation of "managing or general agent."
For examples of cases construing the term, see Trophy Prods., Inc. v. Cinema-Vue Corp., 53
App. Div. 2d 18, 385 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1st Dep't 1976); Clark v. Fifty Seventh Madison Corp., 13
App. Div. 2d 693, 213 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 10 N.Y.2d 808, 178 N.E.2d
225, 221 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1961); B & J Bakery, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 40
Misc. 2d 839, 244 N.Y.S.2d 284 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963), rev'd, 21 App. Div. 2d 783,
250 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dep't 1964). The Court of Appeals had earlier defined a managing
agent as
some person invested by the corporation with general powers involving the exercise
of judgment and discretion, as distinguished from an ordinary agent or attorney,
who acts in an inferior capacity and under the direction and control of superior
authority, both in regard to the extent of his duty and the manner of executing it.
Taylor v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 136 N.Y. 343, 346, 32 N.E. 992, 993 (1893) (citations omitted). The Taylor rule has continued to be relied upon as the traditional test for
determining whether the person served was a "managing agent." See, e.g., Jacobs v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 53 App. Div. 2d 524, 525, 384 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454 (1st Dep't 1976). while the courts
do not require the managing agent to be in charge of the entire operation of the company,
see cases cited in SIEGEL § 70, the Taylor rule has been held to exclude employees in
subordinate or clerical positions that impose no responsibility, e.g., Isaf v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969).
In contrast to "managing or general agent," the final term in CPLR 311(1), "agent[s]
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service," has not been the subject of significant debate. The concluding language of the section was not carried over from the CPA, but
was a new provision inserted into the statute based upon Rule 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See SECOND REP., at 161; note 1 supra. Under common-law agency principles, actual authority can be created expressly or by conduct on the part of the principal
that reasonably leads the agent to believe he is authorized to act. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
AGENCY § 26 (1958). The corporation, however, generally will not be bound by representations of authority by someone not in fact authorized absent some act by the corporation
creating the appearance of authority, see id. § 8, ratification of the act, see id. § 82, or by
estoppel in some circumstances, see id. § 8B. One commentator has suggested that the concept of agency as used in CPLR 311(1) is distinguishable from other agency relationships
because of the limited power conferred. See CPLR 311, commentary at 256 (1972); cf. RE-
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van Realty Organization,Inc. v. Syart Trading Corp.,' the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that a secretary-receptionist's repeated and unreproached practice of accepting service for
the corporation gave rise to a "strong inference" of authorization to
receive service, which would be sustained unless rebutted by the
defendant corporation. 5
In Sullivan Realty, the plaintiff's process server delivered the
summons and complaint to an "all purpose executive-type secretary" employed by the defendant, after the secretary had indicated
she was authorized to accept service.' The secretary, in turn, delivered the summons to the company's comptroller, an officer authorized by statute to receive service.7 At a hearing, the secretary testified that on this and other occasions she had accepted service in
the absence of the officers of the corporation, even though she was
not a director, officer, managing or general agent, cashier or assistant cashier of the corporation.' She further testified that, although
not instructed to do so, she had accepted service five or six times a
year during her 2 years of employment with the corporation and
had never been told to discontinue the practice.' Dismissing the
OF AGENCY § 3(2) (1958) (special agent defined as one authorized to
conduct single transaction or a series of transactions, without continuity of service).
68 App. Div. 2d 756, 417 N.Y.S.2d 976 (2d Dep't 1979).
Id. at 760, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
Id. at 759, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 977. The plaintiff instituted the action to recover a real
estate broker's commission, alleging that a joint venture and a third party each had agreed
to pay one-half of the plaintiff's fee. Id. at 757, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 977. Since service upon a
joint venture may be made by personally serving any of the joint ventures, CPLR 310; see
John's Inc. v. Island Garden Center of Nassau, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 1086, 269 N.Y.S.2d 231
(Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1966), aff'd sub nom. C.J. Zonneveld & Sons, Inc. v. Island Garden Center, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 1021, 280 N.Y.S.2d 84 (2d Dep't 1967) (per curiam), the plaintiff attempted to serve the Thomas Crimmins Construction Co., one of the joint venturers.
Id., 417 N.Y.S.2d at 977. It should be noted that the plaintiff also could have served the
corporation by delivering the summons to the Secretary of State. CPLR 311(1) (Supp. 19791980); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § § 304, 306 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1979-1980); note 1 supra.
The plaintiff's process server, who did not recall the particular service, was permitted to
testify about his usual procedure in serving a corporation, which was to ask for someone
authorized to receive service, and upon learning that a secretary or receptionist was not so
authorized, he would return later to serve a proper party. 67 App. Div. 2d at 757-58, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 977.
67 App. Div. 2d at 760, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
Id. at 758, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978. The secretary explained that none of the corporate
officers were present when she received the Sullivan Realty service. Id. at 758-59, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 978.
1 Id. at 758, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 977. The secretary testified that her duties included answering the telephone and performing secretarial tasks. Id. She also stated without contradiction that in the normal course of her duties, she received all legal papers served upon the
company, noted the time of receipt, and turned them over to the appropriate officer of the
STATEMENT (SECOND)
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complaint, the Supreme Court, Westchester County, ruled that the
plaintiff had failed to prove that process had been served
properly."
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed, finding that service was proper." Writing for a closely divided court,12 Justice Suozzi emphasized that the objective of the
statute, notice to the defendant, had been accomplished, since the
secretary gave the summons to the comptroller. 3 The court reasoned that the actual receipt of the summons, coupled with the
secretary's regular practice during the past 2 years created a
"strong inference" that the secretary was authorized to receive service.14 In the court's view, Sullivan Realty "clearly had a duty to
rebut" the secretary's testimony and the inference of authorization
arising from it, and had not done so."
In an exhaustive dissent, Justice Damiani maintained that

public policy demands strict compliance with the terms of CPLR
311(1). 11 The dissent took the view that the secretary was not a
corporation. Id. at 759, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
10 Id. at 759, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
I Id. at 761, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
12 The majority consisted of Justices Suozzi, Gulotta, and Martuscello. Justice Damiani
authored a dissent in which Justice Titone concurred.
13 Id. at 759-60, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978. Justice Suozzi noted that the secretary served was
an employee of the defendant and that she redelivered the summons to an appropriate corporate officer as part of her routine office procedure. Id. The majority therefore found that an
overly strict interpretation of CPLR 311(1) was unnecessary. Id. Justice Suozzi distinguished
two cases relied upon by the dissent, McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 238
N.E.2d 726, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1968), and Isaf v. Pennsylvania R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578,
299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969). 68 App. Div. 2d at 760-61, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978-79. See
generally notes 16-17 infra. The McDonald Court, observed the Sullivan Realty majority,
indicated its approval of decisions that sustained service on an improper party where the
process server had acted reasonably and diligently in attempting to serve the correct person.
68 App. Div. 2d at 760, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 979. See generally note 2 supra. Addressing Isaf,
Justice Suozzi noted that the case had been "severely criticized." Id. (citing CPLR 311,
commentary at 256 (1972)). In Isaf, the chief clerk of the defendant railroad accepted service
while the freight agent was out of the office and redelivered the papers to the freight agent
within 2 hour. 32 App. Div. 2d at 579, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 232. At the trial, the clerk testified
that he was in charge in the freight agent's absence and that he had received service of
garnishee orders in the past. Id. Employing the Taylor standard to determine whether the
chief clerk was a "managing agent," the Isaf court held that he was not, because his duties
"did not require the exercise of judgment and discretion." Id., 299 N.Y.S.2d at 233. The
court also concluded that the chief clerk could not be considered a temporary "managing
agent," relying on the rule that service on the wrong person is not proper service even though
the papers are later delivered to the correct party. Id.
" 68 App. Div. 2d at 760, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
IS Id.
"

Id. at 762, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 980 (Damiani, J.P., dissenting) (citing McDonald v. Ames
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"managing or general agent" because she had no power to act on
behalf of and bind the corporation, "which is the hallmark of an
agent."'" Additionally, Justice Damiani concluded that the secretary was not an "agent authorized by appointment. . to receive
service" since there was no showing of an express authorization,
which, he argued, was statutorily required. 8 Finally, the dissent
contended that the defendant could not be estopped from claiming
lack of jurisdiction since the plaintiff had failed to sustain its burden of proving that the process server was aware of and relied upon
the defendant's failure to instruct the secretary not to accept
Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 114-16, 238 N.E.2d 726, 728, 291 N.Y.S.2d 328, 331 (1968)).
Justice Damiani asserted that a rigid interpretation of the statute is necessary to deter careless service of process and thus increase the likelihood that defendants will receive actual
notice. 68 App. Div. 2d at 762, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 980 (Damiani, J.P., dissenting).
'1 68 App. Div. 2d 763, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 980-81 (Damiani, J.P., dissenting) (citing Taylor v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 136 N.Y. 343, 32 N.E. 992 (1893); Oustecky v. Farmingdale Lanes, Inc., 41 Misc. 2d 979, 246 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964));
see note 2 supra. The dissent maintained that employees who lack the power to perform
discretionary acts for the corporation in its business affairs are not among those intended by
the legislature as proper recipients for service of process. 68 App. Div. 2d at 764-65, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 981-82 (Damiani, J.P., dissenting) (citing Isaf v. Pennsylvania R.R., 32 App.
Div. 2d 578, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969)). Justice Damiani cautioned against an unwarranted judicial expansion of the statute. 68 App. Div. 2d at 765, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 982
(Damiani, J.P., dissenting). The dissent suggested that, while it might be time to liberalize
the method of serving a corporation, such action should be taken only by the legislature. Id.
at 765-66, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 982 (Damiani, J.P., dissenting).
1168 App. Div. 2d at 768, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 983 (Damiani, J.P., dissenting). The dissent
relied upon federal court interpretations of rule 4(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the source of the phrase "agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service." Id.; see note 3 supra. Rule 4(d)(3) has been interpreted to require an express delegation of the power to accept process. See, e.g., Nelson v. Swift, 271 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
Schwarz v. Thomas, 222 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Fleming v. Malouf, 7 F.R.D. 56
(W.D.N.Y. 1947). But see Boryk v. deHavilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965);
Kamen Soap Prod. Co. v. Struthers Wells Corp., 159 F. Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
Cohen v. Physical Culture Shoe Co., 28 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); 2 MoOma's FEDERAL PRACrICE $ 4.22 [1] (2d ed. 1948). Although under CPLR 318 a corporation may expressly delegate an agent for service of process, the dissent found no evidence of this in
Sullivan Realty. 68 App. Div. at 768, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 983-84 (Damiani, J.P., dissenting).
Nor was it alleged that Sullivan Realty had executed a short-form power of attorney, or that
the broker's contract named the secretary as agent for service. Id., 417 N.Y.S.2d at 984
(Damiani, J.P., dissenting). Justice Damiani asserted that if public policy could be viewed
as not requiring an express delegation, in this case not even an implied agency for the receipt of service had been created. Id. (Damiani, J.P., dissenting). In order for an implied
agency to arise, Justice Damiani stated, corporate acquiescence had to be shown, which
could be found only if the corporation had failed to raise its jurisdictional defense in prior
cases and the secretary had been informed of this failure. Id. at 769, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 984
(Damiani, J.P., dissenting). The dissent therefore concluded that the plaintiff had failed to
prove the prior acquiescence necessary for a finding of implied agency. Id. (Damiani, J.P.,
dissenting).
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service."9
Although the majority, in attempting to temper the concept of
strict construction urged by the dissent, might have appeared to
apply the statutory phrase "managing or general agent,"2 it is submitted that the basis of the holding was that the secretary was an
"agent authorized by appointment

. . .

to receive service."'" CPLR

311(1) does not state that the appointment of an agent to accept
process must be in writing or be indicated by some other express
manifestation.2 2 Accordingly, there appears to be no reason not to
sustain an implied authorization under circumstances such as
those presented in Sullivan Realty, since the function of service of
process-timely notice to the corporation of the claims against
it-is likely to be fulfilled.? Indeed, under facts similar to those in

11

Id.at 770, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 985 (Damiani, J.P., dissenting). The dissenting opinion
also concluded that the defendant had not ratified the secretary's receipt of service since the
defendant had not manifested an intent to treat her act as authorized. Id. (Damiani, J.P.,
dissenting).
See generally id. at 760-61, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978-79.
2, CPLR 311(1) (Supp. 1979-1980). The secretary's uncontradicted testimony revealed
that she was not a managing agent for the corporation. See 68 App. Div. 2d at 759-60, 417
N.Y.S.2d at 978. If such a claim were made, its proponents would have to rebut considerable
precedent excluding lower-level employees from the definition of "managing agent." See
Taylor v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 136 N.Y. 343, 32 N.E. 992 (1893); Isaf v. Pennsylvania R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969); Clark v. Fifty Seventh
Madison Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 693, 213 N.Y.S.2d 849 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 10
N.Y.2d 808, 178 N.E.2d 225, 221 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1961). Some commentators have noted that
the courts have not been liberal in construing the term. See CPLR 311, commentary at 255311.04. But see SIEoEL § 70. Although the standard for
56 (McKinney 1972); 1 WK&M
service upon a "managing agent" has been relaxed in some cases, the facts of Sullivan Realty do not fit easily within the rationales for those exceptions. It is debatable, for example,
whether the redelivery of process to the comptroller could meet the standard of being "so
close both in time and space" as to be part of the same act, see Green v. Morningside
Heights Hous. Corp., 13 Misc. 2d 124, 125, 177 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),
aff'd, 7 App. Div. 2d 708, 180 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1st Dep't 1958); note 3 supra. Nor was the
secretary in Sullivan Realty acting as managing agent at the time of service, 68 App. Div. 2d
at 758, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978, in contrast to findings in other cases, see Buckner v. D & E
Motors, Inc., 53 Misc.2d 382, 278 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Sup. Ct. Erie County 1967); Collini v. Turner Constr. Co., 129 N.Y.S.2d 485 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1954).
It is submitted that the Sullivan Realty holding that the secretary was an "agent authorized by appointment" does not contradict Isaf v. Pennsylvania R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d
578, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969); see note 13 supra, since the Isaf court specifically
premised its decision on the term "managing agent," 32 App. Div. 2d at 579, 299 N.Y.S.2d
at 233. But see CPLR 311, commentary at 114 (Supp. 1979-1980).
12 CPLR 311(1) (Supp. 1979-1980); cf. CPLR 308(3) (Supp. 1979-1980) (authorizes delivery of summons upon an agent designated in writing pursuant to CPLR 318).
" Judge Cardozo said, in reference to service upon a foreign corporation within the
terms of the Civil Practice Act, see note 1 supra: "If the persons named are true agents, and
if their positions are such as to lead to a just presumption that notice to them will be notice
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Sullivan Realty, the first department recently adopted such a
view.24
Practitioners should note that neither department specified the
threshold standards for determining the point at which an inference of agency will arise25 nor indicated the standard of evidence
that will be necessary for defendants to rebut the inference. 2 The
burden of proving that service was properly effected rests upon the
to the principal, the corporation must submit." Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y.
259, 269, 115 N.E. 915, 918 (1917) (citations omitted); accord, Mastan v. Desormeau DairyVend Service, Inc., 11 App. Div. 2d 860, 203 N.Y.S.2d 343 (3d Dep't 1960). Where, as in
Sullivan Realty, definite procedures have been established for the receipt of legal papers by
a secretary, there would seem to be a just presumption that service upon the secretary would
result in notice to the corporation. Even if the secretary in Sullivan Realty had not redelivered the summons to an officer, service nevertheless should be sustained because a true
agency was created. Notwithstanding the dissent's strict requirements for a finding of an
implied agency, see note 18 supra, the Restatement of Agency provides that manifestations
of assent may be made "by any means intended to cause the agent to believe that he is
authorized or which the principal should realize will cause such belief," RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF AGENCY § 26, Comment b (1958). Arguably then, in Sullivan Realty, the comptroller's failure to reprimand the secretary over a 2-year period could cause the secretary to
believe that she was authorized to accept service, thereby creating an implied agency. Similarly, the Second Circuit and the Southern District of New York have held that authorization
of an agent for service of process can be implied from the nature of the employee's duties.
E.g., Boryk v. deHavilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1965); Kamen Soap Prod. Co.
v. Struthers Wells Corp., 159 F. Supp. 706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Cohen v. Physical Culture
Shoe Co., 28 F. Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); see 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRA ricE 4.22[1]
(2d ed. 1948). But see Fleming v. Malouf, 7 F.R.D. 56 (W.D.N.Y. 1947); cases cited in note
18 supra.
24 Fashion Page, Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 69 App. Div. 2d 787, 415 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1st
Dep't 1979). In Fashion Page, the process server was directed by a receptionist to take the
papers to the secretary to the vice president in charge of the office. Id. at 787-88, 415
N.Y.S.2d at 418. The vice president was not in the office at the time, so the secretary, as was
her usual practice, accepted the service after indicating that she was authorized. Id. at 788,
415 N.Y.S. 2d at 418. Noting that the defendant insurance company must have made arrangements for the receipt of service as part of its "regular course of business," id., and that
the secretary apparently had forwarded the summons to the defendant's attorneys immediately, the court concluded that the secretary was an agent authorized by appointment to
receive service. Id.
2 The inference that the secretary in Sullivan Realty has been authorized was based
in part upon the number of times she accepted service-approximfitely 12 times in 2 years.
68 App. Div. 2d at 760, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978. Likewise, the Fashion Page court, see note
24 supra, emphasized that the defendant regularly was served with process and that the
secretary normally accepted service when the vice president was out. 69 App. Div. 2d at 787,
415 N.Y.S.2d at 418. In both Sullivan Realty and Fashion Page, the secretaries accepted service in the absence of a corporate officer. Sullivan Realty, 68 App. Div. 2d at
758, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978; Fashion Page, 69 App. Div. 2d at 788, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
26 Apparently, in neither case did the defendants offer proof on the issue of implied
authorization beyond stating that the secretary had not been authorized. Sullivan Realty, 68
App. Div. 2d at 759, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 978; Fashion Page, 69 App. Div. 2d at 788, 415
N.Y.S.2d at 418.
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one asserting jurisdiction.Y Although alleviated by the inference of
authorization, that burden probably should not be sustained
where, for example, a defendant presents evidence that the secretary spoke untruthfully or negligently or that the secretary's superior acted without authority in permitting him to accept service.2
As a practical matter, the process server may not know at the time
of service whether the secretary has been authorized, regardless of
what the secretary tells him,2 and thus will still be required to
make a reasonable and diligent effort to ensure service upon a
proper person." Accordingly, it appears that Sullivan Realty will
not encourage careless service of process, but may help prevent selective avoidance of service by corporate defendants seeking refuge
in unnecessary formalism.
Lois Peel Eisenstein

ARTicLE 9-CLAss AcTiONS
CPLR 902: Court of Appeals refuses to grant class certification fol-

lowing summary judgment
CPLR 902 places the burden upon the complainant to seek
class certification of his action within 60 days following the expira2 Jacobs v. Zurich Ins. Co., 53 App. Div. 2d 524, 384 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1st Dep't 1976);
Slotnick v. Campanile, 47 App. Div. 2d 536, 363 N.Y.S.2d 614 (2d Dep't 1975), aff'd, 38
N.Y.2d 986, 348 N.E.2d 911, 384 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1976); Saratoga Harness Racing Ass'n v.
Moss, 26 App. Div. 2d 486, 275 N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't 1966), aff'd, 20 N.Y.2d 733, 229
N.E.2d 620, 283 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1967); CPLR § 306 (1972 & Supp. 1979-1980).
2 In FashionPage, the court indicated that the plaintiff should allege in his complaint
whether or not the secretary had been authorized; whether he told the truth about having
the authority to accept the service; what the officer did; and what the corporation did besides moving to vacate the service. 69 App. Div. 2d at 788, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
n The existence of an agency cannot depend merely on "agent's" assertion of authority
absent some manifestation on the part of the corporation which creates the appearance of
authority, see RESTAT~mrr (SEcoND) OF AGENcy § 8 (1958) (apparent authority); id. § 8 B
(estoppel), or by later ratification of the agent's act, id. § 82; see note 2 supra. Thus, the
courts have refused to uphold service merely on the basis of a secretary's statement to the
process server that she could accept the summons. See Coler v. Pittsburgh Bridge Co., 146
N.Y. 281, 40 N.E. 779 (1895); B & J Bakery, Inc. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 21
App. Div. 2d 783, 250 N.Y.S.2d 562 (2d Dep't 1964); Loeb v. Star & Herald Co., 187 App.
Div. 175, 175 N.Y.S. 412 (1st Dep't 1919). CPLR 311(1) does not indicate the agents of the
corporation that have the power to appoint an agent for service of process, but it appears
that a managing agent is unable to make such an appointment. See Isaf v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 32 App. Div. 2d 578, 299 N.Y.S.2d 231 (3d Dep't 1969).
0 See McDonald v. Ames Supply Co., 22 N.Y.2d 111, 115-16, 238 N.E.2d 726, 728, 291
N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (1968); note 2 supra.

